Marion County Superior Court Judge Michael Keele offers some intriguing lessons on Indiana history in his 14-page decision that, at least for now, upholds Indiana's new school voucher law.

More important, his decision could well form the basis of an ultimate Indiana Supreme Court ruling.

Along the way, he explains why a simple four-word phrase in the state constitution – "for the benefit of" – is of vital importance.

But there is also a disturbing suggestion that the constitution doesn't mean all that much when it comes to education and that intent is more important than reality.

Last week's ruling that vouchers are constitutional is not the final word.

The judge only denied a preliminary injunction, which would have halted the voucher program until he rules on the merits of the case.

And given the importance of the issue in Indiana and beyond, it is appropriate for the Indiana Supreme Court eventually to rule on its merits, providing what would most likely be a final decision on the issue.

Still, Keele's ruling offers interesting insight into the way legal professionals can read the same words and reach different conclusions.

Just as the lawyers filing the suit make an excellent case on why the voucher program violates the state constitution, Keele's well-researched reasoning soundly explains why vouchers are constitutional.

With a pro-voucher political mood combined with a state Supreme Court that often errs on the side of supporting the General Assembly, which passed the voucher law, the odds that the pro-voucher side will continue to prevail are strong.

For the benefit of

This is the most important issue in the legal fight between voucher supporters and opponents.

The lawsuit argues that vouchers violate constitutional language that clearly states no tax money shall be used "for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

Going to the legislature's intent, Keele argues that the vouchers are "for the benefit of" students and parents, not churches.

That is similar to the reason the U.S. Supreme Court ruled vouchers do not violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The money is made available to parents, who can choose which of the private schools their children will attend.

Under that argument – also successful in several state-level cases – vouchers are religion-neutral. But Keele sidesteps the fact that so much state money will flow to churches. The vast majority of private schools that will receive money from vouchers are religious, and the majority of them are Catholic schools.

Catholic leaders in Indiana make no secret that the vouchers will financially help the schools, and therefore, the church ministry. In reality, the program intended to help students also helps churches.

No preference

In their suit, opponents argued that vouchers violate language in the state constitution's Bill of Rights that prohibits favoring any religion or anyone to support a place of worship.

But referring to the constitutional convention of 1851, Keele believes that section was designed to prohibit "forced-tithing or other similar government-coerced direct, individual support for churches or ministries."

Furthermore, Keele writes, "that is not the same as, in pursuit of a secular objective, paying or awarding general tax revenues to individuals or families who in turn make individual decisions to use the funds to donate to a ministry or purchase education from a religious school."

Still, to voucher opponents, that begs the question: What is the difference between forced tithing and forcing individual Hoosiers to supplement the income of churches?

Uniform schools

In addressing the allegation that vouchers violate constitutional language requiring a "general and uniform" system of public schools, Keele makes clear that he will err on the side of the legislature.

He cites two Indiana Supreme Court rulings, one from 1982 stating that laws the legislature passes are "clothed with the presumption of constitutionality" and a 2009 decision that, in his view, "deemed issues of education policy authorized by the General and Uniform Clause to be political questions off limits to judicial intervention."

In that case from just two years ago, the high court decided "to the extent that an individual student has a right, entitlement, or privilege to pursue public education … such right derives from enactments of the General Assembly, not the Indiana Constitution."

But Keele's ruling did not explain that language was written in regard to the quality of schools, not the state's obligation to provide them.

The constitution, Keele notes, "directs the legislature to encourage education 'by all suitable means.' " The requirement for public schools is one of those means, Keele wrote, but does not preclude other ones – like paying for students to attend private schools.

He does not, though, address the argument that the cost of vouchers – as much as $65 million a year going to private schools, the plaintiffs contend – interferes with or diminishes the state's obligation to provide public schools.

When delegates wrote the 1851 constitution, Keele noted, they considered – but rejected – language that would have prohibited public financing of private schools.

Soon after delegates adopted the 1851 constitution, the legislature created the system of public schools but continued providing money to private schools.

What's next

The plaintiffs, which include the vice president of the Indiana State Teachers Association, decided not to appeal the preliminary injunction and will instead allow the case to continue on its normal path. Though the judge refused the immediate injunction, he has not ruled on the overall question. Technically, his language was to support his ruling that the plaintiffs would be unlikely to win and trial. Both sides can offer more evidence at trial, including evidence intended to counter the judge's initial reasoning.

The case is likely destined for the Indiana Supreme Court, meaning a final ruling could be months or years away.